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ith scores of  readers in history, the social
sciences, and the public at large, Ken
Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence has been
an enormous and well-deserved success.  Within his-
tory itself, its achievements are nothing
short of  miraculous, for it has overcome
our discipline’s obdurate balkanization (“I
do early modern Europe—why should I
care about Qing China?”) and managed to
bridge the gap between people who would
rarely cross paths or even talk to one an-
other: a world historian, for example, and
an economic historian; or a scholar of  an-
cient East Asia and a specialist on the
British Industrial Revolution.  And it has
shaped the research agenda in a variety of
history’s subfields.
It did all this by posing a question that
could not be ignored, even by the many
historians who have absolutely no interest
in economic history—namely, when did
the yawning gap in incomes open up be-
tween the West and Asia?  China’s as-
tounding economic growth and rise to
power on the world stage made the ques-
tion all the more pressing.  It had to be an-
swered, and it was clear that the smug old
responses of  the past would simply not
do.
Pomeranz’s answer was that the West and East
did not diverge until after 1800, at least if  it is the
wealthiest parts of  Europe and Asia that are com-
pared.  He argued that incomes in the richest parts
of  Asia, such as the Yangzi Delta in China, were just
as high in 1800 as in Britain, the richest part of  Eu-
rope, and he also found that there were no essential
differences between economic institutions in the two
regions.  Given his conclusions, it was no longer pos-
sible to blame China’s failure to develop on ancient
poverty or on some long-term institutional handi-
cap.  Those sorts of  arguments, which had been
common, would simply not work anymore, particu-
larly after other work in Chinese history had called
attention to extraordinary technological advances in
medieval China.
In their place Pomeranz advanced his own ex-
planation for China’s failure to industrialize early, as
Great Britain had.  Britain, he pointed out, had two
crucial advantages over the Yangzi Delta and other
wealthy regions of  Asia.  First of  all, it possessed
cheap, easily accessible coal, which provided abun-
dant energy for factories; and second, it had colonies
that could furnish land-intensive commodities such
cotton and timber.  Britain therefore escaped the
constraints of  preindustrial farming and forestry that
hobbled Asia and the rest of  Europe.  With coal, the
British could heat their homes and run their blast
furnaces without chopping down every tree in the
United Kingdom.  And with colonies they could get
all the raw cotton they needed to turn out the printed
textiles that were the rage during the Industrial Rev-
olution.
Like all successful books, The Great Divergence has
triggered an avalanche of  research, particularly in
economic history.  What does all this subsequent
work say about Pomeranz’s conclusions?  As other
members of  this panel have pointed out, recent pub-
lications suggest that the gap between Britain and
the richest parts of  China actually opened up well
before 1800 and thus earlier than Pomeranz claimed.
Building workers in Britain were earning more than
their counterparts in the wealthiest parts of  China
as far back as the early 18th century.  The British
workers’ real wages were higher and so were their
earnings in silver.  The Chinese building workers
were in fact not on a par with Britain but rather with
the building workers in the backward parts of  Eu-
rope.1
One may of  course worry that building workers
are not representative of  a whole economy.  Further-
more, families drew earnings from sources other
than wages, particularly in China.  Still, the wages do
say something about what semi-skilled workers
earned for their labor alone, and if  further research
confirms the wage figures, then it will be impossible
to avoid the conclusion that the relative price of
labor was higher in Britain than in the richest parts
of  China.   That conclusion would also fit with the
most recent work on the Industrial Revolution.
Growth rates, we now know, were excruciatingly
slow during Britain’s Industrial Revolution; even so,
incomes in Britain ca. 1850 were much higher than
in China.  But if  incomes were higher in 1850 and
growth during the preceding century was slow, then
Britain must have been much richer in 1750 than
China, and wages would have likely been higher, too.2
The high relative wages in Britain
are the key to understanding the Indus-
trial Revolution, or so Robert Allen has
recently argued.   The high wages in
Britain created an incentive to find ways
to replace labor with machines, and the
incentives were particularly strong in
Britain’s large cotton textile industry.  It
faced a ravenous demand for cheap
printed cotton cloth—one of  the pre-
mier consumer goods of  the late 18th
century—because this allowed the
lower classes to ape the silks and other
expensive clothing of  the wealthy, but
at a fraction of  the cost.  The size of
this cotton textile industry magnified
the reward for any inventor who could
discover a way to mechanize the spin-
ning of  cotton, and it helps explain why
the other high-wage European econ-
omy, the Netherlands, failed to indus-
trialize, for among other things, it
lacked a big cotton textile industry.  In
China, India, and much of  continental
Europe, by contrast, there was no such incentive.
Wages were in fact so low that it did not pay to in-
dustrialize, at least before the mid-19th century.3
What about the other causes that Pomeranz in-
vokes—cheap coal and colonies?  Allen’s book bears
out Pomeranz on coal.  It was plentiful in Britain and
cheap, and the low price of  coal added to the rea-
sons to mechanize and replace labor with energy-
consuming machines, particularly steam-driven
pumps and spinning machines.  As for colonies, they
mattered, too, but not for the reasons Pomeranz em-
phasizes.  Colonial goods were important, but not
because they freed up land.  Rather, demand for
colonial goods (not just cotton, but sugar and to-
bacco) was huge, and part of  the great wave of  con-
sumption that swept over the richer parts of
Europe.4 When victories in warfare gave Britain the
lion’s share of  the trade in these colonial goods
(France and the Netherlands were the losers) and in
intercontinental trade as a whole, the British econ-
omy boomed, or so Allen’s economic model shows.
That was in large part what boosted British wages
and created the incentive to mechanize.  Not that
warfare was good for economy—far from it.  Rather,
it was that the British made out like bandits during
the wars, at the expense of  the French, the Dutch,
the Indians, and much of  the rest of  the world.
Higher wages were the result.  This sort of  argument
has been pushed even further in a forthcoming book
by Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong.  They
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ntil the late 20th century the study of
economic history was largely about what
happened in American and Europe his-
tory. For historians of China, in the West as well as
East Asia, economic history was largely about what
didn’t happen. The absence of an industrial revolu-
tion struck generations of scholars to be a subject
worthy of study. During the last two decades of the
century, however, a new body of scholarship arose,
largely in Chinese and Japanese, that documented a
visible and vibrant commercial economy in the early
modern era and helped us set a new baseline for
explaining what Ken Pomeranz famously has called
the great divergence. His book The Great Divergence:
China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World
Economy has two major messages. First, the early
modern Chinese economy was far more similar to
the European economy than non-China specialists
had assumed. He crafts new estimates and indica-
tors of prosperity and productivity to suggest far
more comparable standards of living than previ-
ously imagined. Second, he stresses the importance
of the contrasting locations of natural resources in
China and Europe as well as European access to
windfall gains from production in North America.
Coal and cotton became drivers of divergence.
Pomeranz’s evaluation of these factors brings in an
environmental history component to earlier eco-
nomic history arguments.
The influence of Pomeranz’s interpretation of
the contrasting economic histories of China and
Europe at their moment of divergence has been
widespread and deep. His empirical advances have
inspired economic historians of both China and
Europe to pursue new quantitative work on wages,
agricultural productivity, and standards of living.
His integration of economic history into a world
history embracing new subjects like the environ-
ment and older themes like the European exploita-
tion of other world regions has won him multiple
audiences among and beyond historians. One of
the book’s greatest strengths is its artful presenta-
analyze the effects of  the endemic warfare among
European states and argue that it drove industry into
cities in Europe and ultimately raised European
wages.  The unintended consequence was again an
incentive to mechanize manufacturing, an incentive
that was absent in China because more often than
not China was unified, and not divided into warring
states.5
What should we bring away from all the research
Pomeranz’s book has unleashed?  One conclusion
seems clear: the British Industrial Revolution was not
at all foreordained, even if  British wages were higher
in the early 18th century.  Britain industrialized
thanks to a succession of  historical accidents and un-
likely contingencies, any one of  which could have
completely changed the ultimate outcome.  Britain
was lucky enough to possess cheap coal, and to be an
island that could funnel resources into building up a
powerful navy without the burden of  supporting a
large standing army.  The navy then defended
Britain’s borders and won trade wars that set the
British economy afire and eventually launched the
Industrial Revolution.
No other country could have followed that path.
Had France won the 18th-century trade wars, it
would not have industrialized because the effects of
trade would have been diluted by a much larger pop-
ulation.  The same conclusion would hold with even
more force for China with its enormous population.
But if  Britain had lost the 18th-century wars, it might
not have industrialized at all, and in that case the
whole world might still be mired in poverty.  That,
after all, had been the usual state of  the world for
millenia, simply because no country had leaped over
the threshold of  self-sustaining growth.  Without
Britain’s extraordinary luck, we might all still be
caught in that trap.
Such a nightmarish counterfactual is not the
only one economic historians can conjure up.  One
can in fact imagine other, more pleasant paths that
could have led to industrialization, but via a route
completely from the one Britain took.  Suppose, for
example, that Mongols had never conquered China.
Such an outcome is hardly impossible, for the Mon-
gols’ initial success depended on the charismatic
leadership of  Ghengis Khan, and their empire could
have easily disintegrated before they overcame
China.  Without the Mongols, China would have
been divided into three hostile powers coexisting in
a stable military equilibrium: the Jin, the Western Xia,
and the Southern Song along the coast.  Mercantile
elites in the Southern Song coastal cities might well
have lobbied for a powerful navy so that they could
pursue overseas trade.  Continued warfare and bur-
geoning trade might then have raised wages in these
cities and ultimately sparked industrialization based
not on cheap coal but on water power, as in the early
American textile industry.  And even if  that scenario
did not lead to industrialization before 1800, it might
still have left coastal China with a state that was bet-
ter able to stand up to Western powers and an econ-
omy that was ready to mechanize manufacturing in
the 19th century.
By that time—if  we return to historical reality—
machinery had been greatly improved, and it was
profitable to use virtually everywhere, not just in
Britain.  Why the real China of  the 19th century did
not immediately make use of  this improved machin-
ery and rapidly industrialize remains a big mystery,
just as it did when Pomeranz wrote his book.  That
is a major question that still has to be solved, even if
the divergence began well before 1800.
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